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n his book Historische Gerechtigkeit Lukas
H. Meyer, professor of practical philoso-
phy at the Karl-Franzens University of
Graz, deals with the normative meaning of hi-
storical injustice and discusses its implications
for generations. The author develops a general
theory of intergenerational justice (see also his
article “Intergenerational Justice” in the Stan-
ford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Historical ju-
stice “examines the moral claims, rights and
duties of people owing to historical wrongs”
(Historische Gerechtigkeit, p. 1). In this book,
his investigations concentrate on historical in-
justices which were committed against trans-
generational groups in the past, and in
particular on such crimes that were committed
in the name of a state when it was ruled by a
regime not committed to upholding the rule
of law. Despite the complexity of the subject
the book reads pleasantly and fluently, even for
a novice to the topic, without losing depth and
precision, and takes a stand without losing the
sobriety and distance necessary for a scientific
work.
Meyer distinguishes three main types of duties
of intergenerational justice: vis-à-vis future
human beings, namely not to injure their
claims to suﬃcient well-being; vis-à-vis pre-
sently living people, namely to provide them
with measures of compensation for damages
they have suﬀered due to the lasting eﬀects of
injustices committed against their ancestors;
and thirdly regarding victims of historical in-
justice that are dead, but ought to be remem-
bered adequately.
Many people deny that we bear moral respon-
sibility today for the consequences of the (in-)
actions and misdeeds which were committed
by other people long before our birth. No
young person living today is - as Meyer also
underlines - responsible for past historical in-
justices like slavery in America or the Geno-
cide committed by the Nazis on the Jews and
also on the Roma and Sinti. Those slain are
dead; past injustices were committed in the
past and are therefore concluded. It remains
true, however, that the harmful eﬀects of ear-
lier wrongs are still aﬀecting people. For ex-
ample the black population in the USA is still
aﬀected by structural disadvantages. Also the
cultural heritage and the intrinsic value of the
group aﬃliation of the Jews as well as the
Roma and Sinti are still damaged.
A theory of historical justice systematically ex-
amines these and similar questions by taking
into account philosophical-normative pro-
blems. One of these problems, the so-called
non-identity or contingency problem, is
equally important for the first two main types
of duties of intergenerational justice: The ac-
tions of today’s people have a high probability
of eﬀecting the personal identity, the number
and possibly even on the existence of future
people. Undoubtedly, shocking injustice was
done to Africans who were kidnapped in Africa
and enslaved in America. But if this injustice
had not occurred, most of today’s descendants
of the victims of slavery would not exist at all.
For their existence as persons with their re-
spective identities depends, inter alia, on their
genetic identity, and this depends on who their
parents are and when their parents brought
them into existence. Can persons living today
make claims for compensation because of the
historical injustices committed against their
ancestors if it is true that the assumed bearers
of the claim are not worse oﬀ than they would
be if the injustice had not been committed?
For in this case they would have never come
into existence. 
Even if we had an answer to the non-identity
problem, how could the consequences for the
people living today be determined reliably if
the wrong would have remained undone? In
the conference volume Meyer edited (see below
for more on this) the legal philosopher Jeremy
Waldron states that this hypothetical question
is not answerable if we take seriously the free-
dom of choice of those indirectly aﬀected by
the historical injustice. For taking their free-
dom seriously does not allow one to attribute
normative significance to their predictable de-
cisions, argues Waldron. In the same volume
the philosopher George Sher discusses how the
decisions of the indirectly aﬀected persons di-
minish the normative relevance of the impact
of the historical injustice over the generations.
Meyer’s theory oﬀers a convincing solution for
these two problems: the non-identity problem
and the problem of how to measure the harm
done to indirect victims (ch. 2). Responding
to both problems he suggests a second con-
ception of harm, namely to consider, additio-
nally to the historical-hypothetical conception,
a conception that is identity-independent.
While according to the historical-hypothetical
conception a person is harmed by an action if
the person is worse oﬀ than had the action not
been carried out, the identity-independent
conception understands harm as based on a
threshold level, forbidding actions which result
in the descendants having a quality of life lower
than this threshold level. So, and according to
this conception, currently living people harm
future people if as a result of their actions fu-
ture people are worse oﬀ than they should be.
Since generations living today are a future ge-
neration from the point of view of our ance-
stors, the conception of harm defined by
Meyer can be used independently of time
frames. In order to determine historical inju-
stice a hypothetical comparison is no longer
necessary. The conclusion that these persons
are worse oﬀ than they should be according to
a suﬃcientarian standard of well-being is
enough. Descendants of victims of unjust ac-
tions can count as harmed (or injured) even if
they would not exist without this wrong.
However, the threshold conception of harm is
meant to complement rather than substitute
the hypothetical-historical conception. This is
Meyer’s “combined view”. Therefore, persons
can be harmed according to both conceptions
(or according to one only). Meyer discusses the
diﬃculty of whether harm that can be under-
stood in accordance to both conceptions
weighs heavier than harm that can only be un-
derstood in accordance to one conception, and
in particular only the threshold conception.
However, the threshold conception, while in-
teresting, does not seem to be easily applicable.
It is contested, for instance, whether historical
injustice of slavery as practiced some centuries
ago is causally significant for explaining the less
than average welfare of the slaves’ descendants,
while the causal significance of the historical
fact of colonisation, to which previously colo-
nised states regularly refer to in order to justify
their claims to compensation today, is similarly
contested. Those rich colonial powers that are
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unwilling to pay measures of compensation re-
spond that these states’ underdevelopment is
caused by self-inflicted internal factors. To be
fair, this is a problem for any conception of
compensation that aims at justifying indirect
victims’ claims to compensation owing to the
harmful consequences of historical injustice.
At any rate, the threshold conception does not
have to determine what the current state of af-
fairs would be like had the historical injustice
not been committed. 
Meyer bases his reflections on justice as equa-
lity and on the homogeneity of generations
without, however, discussing the basic con-
cepts of ‘justice’ and ‘generation’. Although for
the ‘Generation’ concept numerous diﬀerent
definitions are conceivable (Old and young,
present and future, the 68s generation / Boo-
merang generation / generation internship
etc.), he renounces a sharp contouring. Alt-
hough one may find this a pity it does not di-
minish the value of his work since the
definition of a generation as a chronologic con-
cept (past – present – future) is implicit in his
work and the question of evaluating and hand-
ling historical injustice can still be discussed.
According to Meyer, even if no harm to the
descendants of victims of historical injustice is
noticeable we can still have reasons to relate to
the victims that are dead today (chap. 3). There
are at least two attempts to show that presently
living people can have duties towards the dead
even if we suppose that dead people bear no
rights today. According to Joel Feinberg’s posi-
tion on posthumous harm, interests of people
while they are alive can be injured through
posthumous conditions. However, according
to this position the harm must have occurred
before the death of the person. This argument
presupposes a deterministic view of when
harmful action occurs, for example, the post-
humous defamation. Meyer however explica-
tes the view that presently living people can
have duties towards dead people which today
do not correspond with the rights of the now
deceased persons. Considering historical inju-
stices and given the frequently observable de-
nial of such injustices it is a general duty for
those who can be identified as the bearers of
the duty to remember the victims of historical
injustices properly. This right to be remembe-
red even survives the death of the bearer of
rights. The idea of the ‘surviving duties’ is in-
teresting since it justifies duties of present ge-
nerations to which no corresponding rights of
the past generations exist. While deceased
people can have no rights any more, living
people today stand under the duty to keep alive
the memory of the historical injustices suﬀe-
red by them.
Based on these main elements of his theory of
historical justice Meyer discusses the intrinsic
34
value of the aﬃliation to ethnic groups and de-
velops political recommendations for Roma
and Sinti which had to suﬀer from injustices
under National Socialism, and the Saami, the
only indigenous ethnic group in Europe,
whose larger cultural and political autonomy
should be supported (chap. 4-5). In other
chapters he investigates the legality of prose-
cuting legal injustices committed under a pre-
vious regime that did not adhere to the
principles of the rule of law (chap. 6), and sub-
sequently deals with the question to what ex-
tent truth committees in connection with
conditional amnesties can deal better with hi-
storical injustice than penal prosecutions by
national or international courts of law (chap.
7).
Meyer’s considerations of historical justice are
richly supplemented by the contributions of
the primarily English omnibus volume Justice
in Time – Responding to Historical Injustice. The
omnibus volume includes the contributions of
renowned experts to an international confe-
rence held in Potsdam in 2001, chaired by
Meyer and the Israeli legal philosopher Chaim
Gans.
The conference volume publishes a total of 21
contributions from which the first half is de-
voted to the analysis and development of phi-
losophical perspectives on historical wrongs,
and the second half to institutional responses
to historical injustice. The philosopher Paul
Patton of the University of New South Wales,
Sydney, for example uses a diﬀerent approach
to Meyer to solve the non-identity problem: If
we suppose that the relevant identity of trans-
generational groups remains steady over time
and that these groups were harmed as such,
then the non-identity problem does not arise
and these groups can be bearers of claims to
compensation and restitution today. Possibly
the corresponding duties can also be ascribed
to a group of culprits as such if we suppose that
it does not change its identity in a relevant way
over the course of time. Meyer discusses this
view of the historical responsibility of groups
in chapter 5 of Historical Justice. He argues
convincingly that not only individuals as such,
but also individuals as a part of a group, and a
group as a collective, can have diﬀering ‘histo-
rical responsibilities’.
Contributors to the volume also ask under
which conditions generations living today may,
by their decisions, bind their successors, who
are members of their group, who will exist in
the future. A demand for consistency in this
context, which Australian philosopher Janna
Thompson states, is that present generations
may only do so if they also accept themselves
to be bound to the fulfilment of the obligations
passed on to them by their predecessors. A
further question concerns the normative signi-
ficance of identity-creating historical relations
of a group to a territory, and in particular
whether such relations can help to justify a
claim for this land as the group’s homeland, for
example in the case of the Jews and Palestini-
ans with respect to Palestine or in the case of
indigenous peoples with respect to the land
from which they were expelled (Chaim Gans,
Paul Patton and Janna Thompson). Both are
questions which Meyer tries to deal with in
chapter 4 of his book.
A couple of other articles deal with aspects of
the ‘Transition to Democracy’. They focus on
how presently living people may and ought to
respond to the actions and suﬀerings of pre-
viously living people who lived under a regime
with no established rule of law. Meyer dedica-
tes chapters 6 and 7 of his book to socio- and
legal-philosophical research on this topic and
submits concrete legal and political reform sug-
gestions. In the omnibus volume the sociolo-
gist Claus Oﬀe examines the penal eﬀorts of
coping with the unlawful GDR regime, the
legal philosopher David Lyons examines the
racist history of the US and Jaime Malamud-
Goti, one of the architects of the human rights
trials in Argentina, examines how Chile came
to terms with Pinochet’s unlawful regime.
Also especially interesting is the contribution
by Belgian philosopher Axel Gosseries who in-
vestigates the justice assessment of climate
change. He analyses the case of two states: the
first emitted massive amounts of carbon di-
oxide in the past and suﬀered no harms owing
to this, while the second, without being re-
sponsible for such emissions, suﬀered harms
owing to the emissions produced by the first.
This contrived case can be considered an ideal
type of scenario applicable in the real world,
for instance, to the USA and Bangladesh. The
earlier generations cannot be blamed because
they could not know about the harmfulness of
their actions. However, due to the ban on free
riding (which can also be understood transge-
nerationally), a compensation by the descen-
dants of the emitters is to be demanded for the
injured people on moral grounds. Unlike the
equality principle often proposed in the cli-
mate debate, the ban on free riders postulated
by Gosseries would only balance out the value
of the advantage originating from the wrong
without having to necessarily completely com-
pensate for the original damage. However, this
view does not take into consideration the non-
identity problem that is applicable to advan-
tages also gained from the eﬀects of historical
wrong. Gosseries’ involuntary free riders would
probably not have come into existence with the
personal identities they have had there been no
industrialisation. One would argue, with
Meyer, that it is only relevant whether certain
actions press the prosperity of the descendants
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of a group under a (suﬃciency-) threshold
value. The distribution of advantages from
emitting carbon dioxide (by distribution of
emission rights), exceeding such a threshold
value of well-being, is not a question concer-
ning the fair compensation for damages, but a
question concerning the fair (global) distribu-
tion of these rights among presently living per-
sons (see in particular Meyer (2004):
“Compensating Wrongless Historical Emissi-
ons of Greenhouse Gases” as well as Meyer and
Dominic Roser (2009): “Climate Justice and
Historical Emissions”).
Meyer’s work oﬀers a comprehensive answer to
the most important philosophical questions on
the relationship between the generations. In his
book Historical Justice he focuses on the nor-
mative (moral as well as juridical) relationship
between early and present generations. How -
ever, with respect to future generations Meyer’s
non-relational understanding of inter gene -
rational justice is not the dominant view in the
literature (which does not mean, of course, that
it is mistaken): While most philosophers be-
lieve that we stand under the duty vis-à-vis fu-
ture people to make them at least equally well
oﬀ, Meyer allows for future people to be worse
oﬀ as long as they reach the suﬃcientarian
threshold of well-being. However, Meyer ar-
gues that currently living people do stand
under duties, other than duties of justice, that
speak in favour of making future people as well
or better oﬀ than themselves. (Chap. 4 and 5)
Without getting involved in the contradictions
of the complicated material, Meyer delivers a
fully developed theory on the meaning of hi-
storical injustice and the moral and political
consequences that follow. He does not only
reason abstractly, but commits himself to prac-
tical action and recommendations for concrete
cases.
Apart from Meyer’s legal-political suggestions
considering the statute of the international
penal court of law in chap. 7, the discussion of
how institutional measures can prevent possi-
ble historical injustice for future generations
from the start is absent in Historical Justice:
Meyer discusses the diﬀerent possibilities for
the material compensation and symbolic resti-
tution for historical injustice, but disregards
how a social order could be formed in order to
ensure that historical wrong could be avoided
from the start.
In other publications Meyer examined questi-
ons of environmental justice and in particular
climate change under the aspect of historical
justice. The historical injustice of excessive hi-
storical emissions is not committed against sin-
gle (possibly ethnic) groups, but against today's
and future generations as a whole (on the na-
tional level or worldwide). How do we proceed
with the dilemma that the raw materials that
past generations used irreparably have produ-
ced nuclear waste, manipulated the ozone layer
and atmosphere, but at the same time have
created prosperity through materials and in-
dustry which we profit from today at the ex-
pense of future generations? How could an
adequate reaction to such an injustice be for-
med?
Surely not by continuing with the wrong. Ne-
vertheless this is sadly the case today. The un-
pleasant outlook is that future generations
could bring us to justice in tribunals.
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he peer-reviewed journal Intergenera-
tional Justice Review (IGJR) aims to
improve our understanding of inter-
generational justice and sustainable develop-
ment through pure and applied ethical
research. Regularly published in English and
German, the IGJR (ISSN 1617-1799) seeks ar-
ticles representing the state-of-the-art in the
politics, law, and philosophy of intergeneratio-
nal relations. It is published on a professional
level with an extensive international readership.
The editorial board comprises over 50 interna-
tional experts from ten countries, and repre-
senting eight disciplines. The IGJR is not only
read by the scientific community but also by
members of parliaments, decision makers from
the economy and persons with a general inte-
rest in intergenerational justice.
Proposal for articles: 
If you are interested in submitting an article
please send us a short proposal (up to 500 cha-
racters). Subsequently, the editors will contact
you and discuss the details of your possible ar-
ticle.
Size limit of final article: 
Up to 30,000 characters (including spaces, an-
notation etc.). These are between 4,500 and
5,000 words. 
The editors are seeking articles in English for
the upcoming issue 2/2008 of the IGJR:
A Young Generation Under Pressure? The Fi-
nancial Situation and the “Rush Hour” of
the Cohorts 1970-1985 in a Generational
Comparison
The topic: 
This issue is divided into two parts, the first one
dealing with the time restrictions of the young
generation, the second part with their financial
situation – both from a life course perspective. 
The first part: even though life expectancy con-
tinues to rise, many people feel that they do not
have the time to combine work, children and
leisure. This focuses on the easing of the so-cal-
led “rush hour” of life between 28 and 38 years
of age. In this period, people finish their studies;
they take decisive career steps and have to de-
cide whether or not to start a family. It is this
crucial period of time we have to examine to de-
tect the underlying causes for the diﬀerence bet-
ween the desired and the (lower) actual number
of children in various in dustrialized countries.
Key questions are:
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